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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Since the 1970s, marriage rates have declined throughout the developed world and 
unmarried cohabitation has become increasingly important. Despite the growing 
importance, unmarried couples face a wide range of legal frameworks if their relationship 
breaks down. For example, in many US states and in England and Wales family law does 
not cover unmarried couples. In contrast, in Australia, New Zealand, and parts of Canada, 
unmarried couples face the same property division regime as married couples. 
We examine the effects of the extension of the Australian Family Law Act to unmarried 
couples, focusing on how being subject to equitable property division laws affects the 
behaviour of intact couples. Before 2009, laws determining post-separation financial 
settlements for unmarried couples varied between states and territories, ranging from 
marriage-equivalence to far more restrictive provisions. In 2008, the provisions of the 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) were extended to unmarried couples, harmonizing the legal 
regime across the country with effect from 1 March 2009. We use this natural experiment 
to identify the causal effect of being subject to marriage-equivalent equitable property 
division laws. 
We find that existing couples are more likely to make relationship-specific investments 
after being exposed to laws enabling the equitable redistribution of property in the event 
of relationship breakdown. In affected couples we find that men increase their 
employment and women increase time spent on housework. Couples have more children 
and are more likely to become home owners. When examining self-reported life 
satisfaction, we find similar effects for men and women, with an increase in financial 
satisfaction offset by a reduction in partner satisfaction. 
These results demonstrate the causal effect of property division laws on relationship-
specific investments and demonstrate that legal approaches aimed at sharing the 
financial burden of relationship breakdown can have important incentive effects for 
existing couples. This means that a potentially unintended consequence of these laws is 
that they make unmarried couples behave more like married couples.  
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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the effect of extending equitable property division divorce laws to 
unmarried cohabiting couples in Australia. Using a triple-difference fixed effects 
approach we show that existing couples are more likely to make relationship- specific 
investments after being exposed to laws enabling the equitable redistribution of property 
in the event of relationship breakdown. In affected couples we find that men increase 
their employment and women increase time spent on housework. Couples have more 
children and are more likely to become home owners. These results demonstrate the 
causal effect of property division laws on relationship-specific investments and inform 
the ongoing international debate about the appropriate legal treatment of unmarried 
cohabiting couples. 
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1 Introduction
Divorce laws affect household behavior both within and outside marriage.1 The legal
regime governing the division of property after divorce affects bargaining power (Chi-
appori, Fortin, and Lacroix, 2002) and incentives to make marriage-specific investments
(Stevenson, 2007; Fisher, 2012; Lundberg and Pollak, 2015; Lafortune and Low, 2017).
Evidence of these effects has improved our understanding of intrahousehold behavior.2
Since the 1970s, marriage rates have declined throughout the developed world.
Unmarried cohabitation has become increasingly important (Kennedy and Fitch, 2012;
Klu¨sener, Perelli-Harris, and Gassen, 2013). In 2011, 12% of adults aged 20-34 in the
United States were cohabiting. In Australia the prevalence was 18%, and as high as 22%
in Canada and the United Kingdom (OECD, 2016). Despite this importance, in many
jurisdictions family law has lagged behind. Unmarried couples face a wide range of legal
frameworks. There is no recourse to family law in many US states and in England and
Wales. In contrast, unmarried couples face the same property division regime as married
couples in Australia and parts of Canada (Waggoner, 2016). The extension of the full
range of family law to unmarried couples is a recent phenomenon, and so there is little
evidence of how post-separation property division laws affect unmarried couples.
We examine the effects of extending equitable property division laws to unmarried
couples in Australia. Before 2009, laws determining post-separation financial settlements
for unmarried couples varied between states and territories. Some, including Queensland
and Western Australia, modeled legislation on that for married couples, giving courts
substantial discretion to reallocate property to achieve an equitable outcome. Others,
including New South Wales and Victoria, took a more restrictive approach. In 2008, the
provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) were extended to unmarried couples, har-
monizing the legal regime governing post-separation property division across the country
with effect from 1 March 2009. This represented a large change in the law for states and
territories previously taking a restrictive approach. The legislation was part of a suite
1For example, the introduction of unilateral divorce has been linked to higher divorce rates in the
United States and Europe (Kim and Oka, 2014; Wolfers, 2006; Friedberg, 1998; Kneip, Bauer, and Rein-
hold, 2014; Gonza´lez and Viitanen, 2009; Gonza´lez-Val and Marce´n, 2012), reduced rates of domestic
violence and suicide (Dee, 2003; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006; Brassiolo, 2016), increased rates of violent
crime (Ca´ceres-Delpiano and Giolito, 2012) and worse educational and labor market outcomes (Gru-
ber, 2004), lower fertility (Drewianka, 2008; Bellido and Marce´n, 2014), increased female labor supply
(Genadek, Stock, and Stoddard, 2007; Stevenson, 2008), reduced housework by women (Genadek, 2014;
Roff, 2017) and reduced marriage-specific investments (Stevenson, 2007).
2The recipient of unearned income (Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales, 1997; Duflo, 2003), sex ratios
in the marriage market (Angrist, 2002; Porter, 2016) and abortion laws (Oreffice, 2007) have also been
shown to be important determinants of bargaining power with resultant effects on intrahousehold resource
allocation.
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of reforms designed to provide rights to same-sex couples, and was not driven by the
demands of opposite-sex unmarried couples.3
We exploit this legal reform to examine how the imposition of equitable property
division laws affects the behavior of intact opposite-sex couples. We use longitudinal
data from the Household, Income and labor Dynamics in Australia Survey (HILDA), and
implement a triple-difference fixed effects strategy. This compares the relative change in
behavior between cohabiting and married couples in states experiencing large changes in
the legal regime to states with comparatively little change.
We find that the imposition of an equitable property division regime increases house-
hold specialization for unmarried couples: men are more likely to be employed, and women
increase time spent on housework. Affected couples make more relationship-specific in-
vestments including having more children, increasing the number of children they intend
to have, and are more likely to be home owners. We find no change in self-reported life
satisfaction overall, but find an increase in financial satisfaction offset by a reduction in
partner satisfaction for both men and women. Our results are not explained by changes
in marriage decisions after the reform. These results demonstrate that an important
mechanism through which being subjected to equitable property division laws influences
economic behavior is by enabling relationship-specific investments. In contrast, prior
literature has mostly focused on how changes in post-separation financial arrangements
affected the balance of bargaining power within households, transferring utility from one
partner to another.
Our results contribute to a nascent literature examining how the expansion of the
reach of family law affects unmarried couples. Rangel (2006) examines the 1994 extension
of alimony rights to cohabiting couples in Brazil, finding evidence of reduced hours of work
in the labor market and home for women and increased school enrollment for first-born
girls, particularly among lower-educated women. More recently, Chiappori et al. (2016)
and Gousse´ and Leturcq (2018) have evaluated between-province differences in the family
law framework in Canada. They find that the extension of alimony laws to unmarried
couples reduces women’s labor supply in existing couples (Chiappori et al., 2016), and in
some cases increases men’s labor supply (Gousse´ and Leturcq, 2018).
Whilst our results are broadly consistent with this literature, the Australian con-
text differs from Brazil and Canada in important dimensions. First, unlike these two
both countries, alimony is uncommon in Australia (Fehlberg, 2004), and so our analysis
focuses specifically on the impact of changes in post-separation property division.4 Sec-
3Same-sex couples were unable to marry in Australia until 9 December 2017.
4Whilst Gousse´ and Leturcq (2018) examine both alimony and property division laws, the latter is
limited to changes in provinces representing less than 7% of the Canadian population.
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ond, the Australian reform is comparatively recent, coming into force in 2009, and was
not accompanied by changes in laws governing child custody or child support.
Our results advance the literature in two ways. First, the rich data we use allows
us to examine effects on housework, fertility, home ownership and dimensions of life sat-
isfaction, moving beyond a focus on labor supply. This means we can draw stronger
conclusions about how property division laws affect the relative well-being of men and
women. This approach reveals the importance of equitable property division laws in
enabling couple-specific investments. Second, in contrast to Rangel (2006) our analyti-
cal approach exploits cross-jurisdiction variation in legal changes, and in contrast to the
Canadian studies we take a triple-difference strategy, using married couples as an ad-
ditional control group, meaning that our results are robust to state-specific shocks and
trends affecting couple behavior in general.
Our rich data enables us to bring fresh evidence of the causal effects of laws gov-
erning property division on relationship breakdown. The empirical regularity of higher
relationship-specific investments, particularly investments in children, in marriages com-
pared to unmarried couples has been largely attributed to selection: couples who want
to make these investments choose marriage and its associated protections (Lundberg and
Pollak, 2015). In contrast, we demonstrate that being exposed to these laws leads couples
who have not self-selected to make such investments. Moreover, these results provide
evidence for the ongoing international legal debate about the appropriate treatment of
unmarried couples (Douglas, Pearce, and Woodward, 2009; Miles, Wasoff, and Mordaunt,
2012; Waggoner, 2016).
We proceed by providing an overview of the Australian institutional context includ-
ing details of the legal reform. Section 3 then outlines the ways in which family law
may influence household behavior, and the existing empirical evidence. Sections 4 and 5
describe our empirical strategy and data respectively. Section 6 presents the results, and
Section 7 concludes.
2 Property division for unmarried couples in Aus-
tralia
The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (hereafter FLA) determines the way that property is
divided in the event of divorce for married couples in Australia. It provides broad discre-
tion for the reallocation of property, including retirement savings, considering the parties’
financial and non-financial contributions to the relationship and their present and future
economic needs. The court must be satisfied that any order is ‘just and equitable’ given
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the circumstances.5 The reference to the future economic needs of parties typically results
in a property adjustment in favor of wives, particularly where they are the primary carer
of any children: recent empirical evidence suggests that mothers obtain around 60% of
property on average (Kaspiew and Qu, 2016). Most cases are settled with a clean break,
with ongoing maintenance payments (alimony) ‘rare, minimal and brief’ (Fehlberg, 2004).
Whilst many divorcing couples make their post-separation financial arrangements without
going to court, consultation with lawyers is common, meaning that the legal framework
influences property settlements more generally (Kaspiew and Qu, 2016). We refer to the
Australian regime under the FLA as equitable property division.
Prior to 2009, the FLA did not apply to unmarried couples. States and territories
had individual approaches to dealing with property matters for separating unmarried
couples, known as De Facto relationships in Australian law. New South Wales was the first
state to legislate in 1984,6 with all other states and territories following suit since. In all
states, legislation set out gateway requirements for unmarried relationships to be subject
to the relevant law, typically a two-year duration requirement or that the couple have a
common child.7 There was, however, substantial heterogeneity in between jurisdictions
in what matters could be considered when making a property adjustment (Willmott,
Mathews, and Shoebridge, 2003).
We follow Willmott, Mathews, and Shoebridge (2003) and identify three approaches.
The first is substantially more restrictive than the FLA and was taken by New South
Wales, Victoria and the Northern Territory. In these states, courts could consider finan-
cial and non-financial contributions to the relationship, but not the future needs of the
partners. This limited approach prevented state and territory courts from using FLA case
law to guide decision-making.8 The second approach closely mirrors the FLA, considering
the partners’ contributions to the relationship and their present and future financial needs,
with particular reference to any effects “on the earning capacity of either party”. This
approach was adopted in Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia, giving courts a
high level of discretion in reallocating a couple’s property to achieve an equitable outcome.
A third, intermediate approach was adopted by he Australian Capital Territory
(ACT) and South Australia, directing the courts to consider “other relevant matters”
without explicitly specifying earnings capacity or future needs, and so was also not able
to rely on precedent cases under the FLA. In our analysis below we will collapse this third
category into the limited category.
5See Chapter 13 of Fehlberg et al. (2014) for further details on the Australian legal context.
6De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW), now renamed Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW).
7The duration requirement was three years in South Australia.
8It is important to note that even the restrictive approach taken by New South Wales and Victoria
(pre-2008) provided substantially more scope for reallocating property for unmarried couples who separate
compared to most US states and to England and Wales, where unmarried couples must rely on standard
contract law.
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Table 1: State and Territory laws governing property division for unmarried cohabiting
couples
State/Territory Year Legislation Category
New South Wales 1984 Property (Relationships) Act 1984 Limited
Victoria 1987 Property Law (Amendment) Act 1987 Limited
Northern Territory 1991 De Facto Relationships Act 1991 Limited
ACT 1994 Domestic Relationships Act 1994 Intermediate
South Australia 1996 Domestic Partners Property Act 1996 Intermediate
Queensland 1999 Property Law Amendment Act 1999 FLA-equivalent
Tasmania 1999 De Facto Relationship Act 1999 FLA-equivalent
Western Australia 2002 Family Court Amendment Act 2002 FLA-equivalent
Victoria 2008 Relationships Act 2008 FLA-equivalent
The state and territory legislation took effect at different times, as shown in Table 1.
States legislating earlier took the more restrictive approach, with later-moving states more
closely mirroring the FLA. Victoria legislated for a second time in 2008, making their laws
comparable to the FLA.
The Family Law Amendment Act (2008) extended the FLA provisions to all unmar-
ried cohabiting couples with a two-year relationship or a common child. This took effect
on 1 March 2009, harmonising the treatment of married and unmarried couples across
states and territories for property division in the event of relationship breakdown.9 The
amendment also enabled the splitting of retirement savings for unmarried couples across
Australia, which had not previously been provided for in any state legislation.
The 2008 amendment was part of a package of legal reforms targeted at providing
same-sex couples with the protections of married couples. The lack of federal legislation
governing de facto relationships was identified as a source of inequality for same-sex
couples in the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission’s Same-Sex: Same
Entitlements report (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2007). It was
not the result of a campaign by unmarried cohabiting couples to extend the FLA rights,
and therefore it is unlikely that changes in the property division regime affecting unmarried
opposite-sex couples are endogenously determined.
It is also important to note that married and unmarried opposite-sex couples were
otherwise similarly treated by the Australian legal system and government. Matters
concerning child custody and child support have been determined at the federal level for
all couples since the late 1980s (Nicholson, 2000), whilst the national child support scheme
9The Amendment did not take effect until 1 July 2010 in South Australia as the state did not referred
its relevant legislative powers to the Commonwealth until later in 2009. Western Australia continues to
retain its legislative powers over this and other Family Court matters, dealing with all family issues
in the Family Court of Western Australia. WA legislation is comparable to Australian Commonwealth
legislation in this area, and the Family Court of Western Australia operates similarly to the Family Court
of Australia with comparable expertise and complementary service provision (Willmott, Mathews, and
Shoebridge, 2003). Later we present robustness checks that exclude WA.
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was established in 1988 and has always applied to separated parents regardless of prior
marital status. This meant that separating unmarried couples with children needed to
refer to both federal and state courts to fully resolve their separations. Binding pre-nuptial
or cohabitation agreements are open to both married and unmarried couples, though their
prevalence is low and their enforceability is unclear (Fehlberg and Smyth, 2002; Rowan,
2018). Finally, cohabiting couples have been treated in the same way as married couples
for the purpose of family benefits and welfare payments throughout our study period.
3 The influence of family law on household behavior
The way that property is divided after relationship breakdown can affect the behavior
of couples through three key mechanisms: the effect on the balance of bargaining power
within the household; the effect on the cost of relationship breakdown; and the effect on
incentives to make relationship-specific investments. There may also be different effects
for existing couples compared to new couples. Here we outline the intuition behind these
mechanisms and their empirical implications.
3.1 Bargaining power
First, property division laws can change the balance of power within a household as they
change a couple’s outside options. The influence of outside options on intrahousehold
behavior is central to non-unitary models of household behavior, including those based
on cooperative bargaining (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981) and
in collective model representations (Chiappori, 1992).10 In general, when one partner
experiences an improvement in their outside option, they improve their bargaining power
and may use that to gain a higher share of resources within a relationship.
Property division laws directly affect a couple’s outside options. Property division
laws directly affect a couple’s outside options. In the absence of equitable property divi-
sion laws, Australian unmarried couples were limited to property adjustments to reflect
their financial and non-financial contributions to the relationship. This did not allow
adjustments due to the ongoing consequences of these contributions, including the longer-
term effects of reducing paid work to undertake childcare. Moreover, the assessment of
the value of non-financial contributions to the relationship was typically lower than for
married couples assessed under the FLA, and the legal ownership of property was an
10In contrast, unitary models of the household assume that household behavior can be represented
as the maximization of a single utility function. This implies income pooling, which has been rejected
empirically (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996).
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important factor in inferring financial contributions (Fehlberg and Behrens, 2008).11 As a
result of the gender wage gap and the continuing prevalence of women as primary carers
for children, this typically meant women receiving less than half of a couple’s combined
property on separation. The addition of prospective factors, i.e. future economic needs,
to those under consideration under the equitable property division regime changed this
substantially, usually increasing women’s outside options at the expense of men’s. This
implies a shift in bargaining power that, on average, is in women’s favor.
The increase in women’s bargaining power should be reflected empirically by an
increase in women’s well-being and a reduction in women’s labor supply and housework,
with opposite effects for men. To the extent that women have stronger preferences than
men for having children or being home owners, we may also see an increase in fertility
and home ownership.
Evidence of this effect has been demonstrated for married couples across a range of
contexts, in many cases using changes in labor supply as a proxy for changes in leisure
time (Gray, 1998; Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix, 2002; Voena, 2015). However, for
unmarried couples this evidence primarily considers the impact of alimony and not on the
division of property (Chiappori et al., 2016; Gousse´ and Leturcq, 2018).12
3.2 Separation costs
A second mechanism for property division laws affecting within-relationship behavior is
through the costs they introduce in the event of relationship breakdown. As separation
costs increase, the probability of relationship breakdown falls: a bigger negative shock
to relationship quality is needed to offset the gains from the relationship. This increases
the expected payoff to relationship-specific investments, serving as a commitment de-
vice (Becker, Landes, and Michael, 1977; Matouschek and Rasul, 2008; Fahn, Rees, and
Wuppermann, 2016). The implication is that increasing the costs of relationship break-
down will increase relationship-specific investments such as having children or becoming a
home owner.13 The extension of equitable property division arguably increases the costs
of relationship breakdown. We therefore expect to see an increase in relationship-specific
investments for affected couples.
11Millbank (2009) provides examples of NSW cases pre-FLA expansion, demonstrating the limits
to property redistribution even in the presence of substantial non-financial contributions of the poorer
partner during long relationships.
12For the Australian reforms we examine, Latti (2016) uses a subsample of around 300 unmarried
couples from an earlier release of the HILDA Survey data, and finds some evidence of a temporary
increase in women’s work hours for couples affected by the reforms. However, we find that this result is
not robust to expanding sample selection and the inclusion of more flexible time trend controls.
13Whilst a home can be sold in the event of relationship breakdown, the transaction costs involved in
both buying and selling a home give it some characteristics of a relationship-specific investment.
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The shift from consent to unilateral divorce laws has been widely interpreted as a
reduction in the costs of divorce. Analysis of these changes has provided evidence in favor
of the importance of separation costs, namely showing that unilateral divorce decreased
fertility levels (Rasul, 2006; Stevenson, 2007; Bellido and Marce´n, 2014). However, this
mechanism has not been studied for unmarried couples.
3.3 Relationship-specific investments
Property division laws can also affect the incentives to make relationship-specific invest-
ments by solving (or creating) an investment hold-up problem (Fisher, 2012; Fahn, Rees,
and Wuppermann, 2016). Key to this mechanism is that some relationship-specific in-
vestments are asymmetric. The primary example is having children: it remains over-
whelmingly common for a woman to reduce her labor supply and experience a long-term
reduction in human capital when she has children.14 Other examples include making lo-
cation choices that are particularly beneficial to the career of one partner (Lundberg and
Pollak, 2003). Where the legal regime provides no compensation for these asymmetric
costs in the event of relationship breakdown this may prevent such investments from oc-
curring. On the other hand, a division of property (or an ongoing alimony payment) that
provides compensation can enable these Pareto-improving investments.15
The FLA expansion introduced prospective grounds for property reallocation. Within
the Australian family law system, the ‘future needs’ factor typically results in a property
adjustment in favor of a mother with ongoing primary care responsibilities (Fehlberg et
al., 2014). Unmarried couples becoming subject to equitable property division laws expe-
rienced a change in potential post-separation financial arrangements that was particularly
significant where children were present. We therefore expect fertility, specialization and
other relationship-specific investments to increase among affected couples.
This mechanism has been empirically evaluated by considering the effects of a reduc-
tion in the generosity of German alimony laws for married mothers, finding a reduction in
fertility (Fahn, Rees, and Wuppermann, 2016). The mechanism has not been examined
for unmarried couples, with the existing research focused on labor market outcomes (Chi-
appori et al., 2016; Gousse´ and Leturcq, 2018). Our rich data allow us to consider labor
market activity alongside housework hours, fertility, home ownership and self-reported
satisfaction, meaning we are able to consider effects on this broader range of outcomes.
14Recent evidence shows that this is persistent even in Scandinavian countries where policies to enable
women to combine work and motherhood are most advanced (Kleven, Landais, and Søgaard, 2018).
15If couples are able to write binding contracts for property division in the event of relationship
breakdown this could also solve the investment hold-up problem. Prenuptial contracts are, however, rare
and hard to enforce in Australia (Rowan, 2018).
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3.4 Existing versus new couples
The mechanisms above have been described for existing couples. Recent research has
established that the impact of changes to property division laws will be different for
newly-formed couples (Chiappori et al., 2016). Forward-looking couples will account
for the future shift in their outside options when they initially form a relationship. As
ongoing welfare for the partners is influenced by equilibrium in the relationship market,
the increase in a woman’s welfare in the event of relationship breakdown will be offset
by reduced welfare within the relationship. New couples forming after the legal reform
will therefore be differently selected, and we would not expect to see any improvement
(and perhaps a decline) in within-relationship well-being for women in new couples. On
the other hand, the improved incentives for relationship-specific investments will apply to
new couples and so we may see increased fertility and specialization for all couples under
the new regime.
4 Empirical strategy
We use the changes to property division laws for unmarried couples across Australia
described in Section 2 to examine how equitable property division laws affect the behavior
of intact couples. We exploit the fact that different states and territories introduced
these laws at different times, either through their own legislation or due to the 2009 legal
expansion, and that married couples were not affected.16 We implement a triple-difference
estimation with individual fixed effects.
We estimate the effect of property division on outcome Yist for individual i in state
s at time t using the following regression:
Yist = β1cohabist + β2equitablest + β3equitablest ∗ cohabist +Xist + µs + γt + θi + εist, (1)
Here, equitablest is an indicator for whether unmarried cohabiting couples were sub-
ject to an equitable property division regime in state s at time t, cohabist is an indicator
for individual i being part of an unmarried cohabiting couple and Xist is a vector of ed-
ucation indicators. State, time and individual fixed effects are captured by µs, γt and
θi, respectively. We also include state-specific linear time trends in some specifications.
This specification compares the change in outcome Yist for unmarried couples relative to
married couples in states affected by a legal reform, and contrasts this with the differ-
ence in changes for married and unmarried couples in states that had equitable property
16The “Limited” and “Intermediate” categories described in Section 2 and Table 1 have been combined
as our analysis showed no detectable difference between these categories.
9
division laws for unmarried couples at that time. It accounts for time-invariant indi-
vidual and state characteristics as well as national shocks over time and state-specific
changes in couple behavior. Coefficient estimate β3 captures how the the extension of
the equitable division laws changed the behavior of affected couples, and is identified by
within-individual changes in behavior for affected cohabiting couples observed both before
and after the legal change.
Our empirical strategy relies on variation in the legal regime between states and over
time. A common approach to inference in such cases is to cluster standard errors at the
state level to account for the correlation of the key regressor within clusters (Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). This approach relies on having a large number of clusters.
However, in the Australian context there are just eight states and territories meaning that
simply using clustered standard errors will over-reject the null hypothesis (Cameron and
Miller, 2015). Instead, we follow Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) and implement a
restricted wild cluster bootstrap approach, which generates bootstrap p-values.17 In our
results tables, we present both the clustered standard errors and these bootstrap p-values.
Our approach assumes that there are no other factors that differentially affect the
behavior of married and unmarried couples in states where equitable property division
was introduced. This assumption would be violated if there were time-varying differences
in the behavior of married and cohabiting couples specific to the states experiencing the
legal change. An advantage of using the third difference with married couples is that it
ensures our results are robust to state-specific shocks affecting couple behavior generally.
This may be important as our sample period covers both the Global Financial Crisis and
the commodity price boom and bust, which affected Australian states in different ways
due to variation in their resource intensity. Another cause for concern would be reforms to
other aspects of family law and policy that affect married couples and cohabiting couples
differently. However, as noted above, over this period married and unmarried couples
were subject to the same rules governing child custody, child support, and family and
welfare payments. So, whilst there have been changes to some of these policies over our
sample period, they affected both married and unmarried couples and so are controlled
for in our regressions.
A further threat to our identifying assumption would be if the states experiencing
a move to equitable property division were in some way different to the other states, and
that the FLA expansion or previous state level legislation was implemented in response
to demands from unmarried couples. The primary motivation of the FLA expansion was
to give rights to same-sex couples who were unable to marry and gain the associated
17This is implemented using the boottest command in Stata, as described by Roodman et al. (2018).
Due to the small number of clusters we use Webb weights. All results are based on 999,999 bootstrap
samples.
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legal protections. Indeed, the federal legislation was just one part of a package of changes
specifically designed to extend rights and protections to same-sex couples. This gives some
confidence that the legislative reform is not driven by changes in opposite-sex unmarried
couple behavior.
The inclusion of individual fixed effects means that our primary results identify
changes in the behavior of couples formed before the change to property division laws
who remain cohabiting couples after the reform. By focusing on continually-cohabiting
couples, we are not capturing the changing selection of couples into different marital
statuses. For example, some couples may either select into the policy (by forming a
relationship after) or actively avoid its implications (by separating before). Unmarried
couples’ decisions to marry may also be affected. In Section 6.1 we examine how the
reform affected these transitions for existing couples, and discuss the implications for our
main results.
5 Data
We use data from fifteen waves of the Household, Income and labor Dynamics in Australia
Survey (HILDA), a nationally representative annual panel survey. The HILDA Survey is
based on an initial sample of 7,682 Australian households, followed annually from 2001
onwards. It captures rich information on labor market outcomes, retrospective reports of
time use and a range of self-reported well-being measures for all household members aged
15 and over. It documents the relationships between all household members including
marital status.18
Our analysis sample consists of married and unmarried opposite-sex cohabiting cou-
ples. We select working-age couples, excluding those where one partner is aged under
18, where the woman is over 60, or where the man is over 65. We also exclude couples
with inconsistent reports of marital status. This gives a sample of 48,028 person-year
observations for 7,714 couples. Of these couples, 4,152 are married (36,134 person-year
observations) and 3,562 cohabiting (11,894 person-year observations).19 For our main
analysis we do not consider whether a cohabiting couple meets the gateway requirements
for being subject to the equitable property division law (a two-year relationship or a com-
mon child); in Section 6.2 we provide additional results taking these requirements into
account.
18A detailed description of the HILDA data can be found in Summerfield et al. (2016).
19The number of couples exceeds the initial number of households in HILDA due to couple formation
throughout the sample period.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Women Men
Married Cohabiting Married Cohabiting
Employed 0.720 0.726 0.897 0.861
(0.449) (0.446) (0.304) (0.346)
36,119 11,884 36,119 11,884
Hours worked 31.005 34.595 45.438 43.452
(14.083) (12.864) (12.607) (12.308)
25,952 8,617 32,361 10,224
Housework hours 18.587 13.246 6.221 6.377
(13.039) (11.765) (6.171) (6.323)
30,545 9,910 29,985 9,604
Home ownership 0.812 0.471 0.812 0.471
(0.390) (0.499) (0.390) (0.499)
33,405 11,304 33,405 11,304
Number own children 1.491 0.744 1.431 0.516
(1.231) (1.076) (1.222) (0.885)
36,119 11,884 36,119 11,884
Hours with children 16.244 11.512 7.449 6.080
(22.158) (20.998) (10.108) (12.021)
29,273 9,335 278,973 9,068
Fertility intention 1.778 2.082 1.807 2.072
(0.883) (0.845) (0.954) (0.921)
5,047 4,598 5,582 4,523
Satisfaction: 6.652 6.079 6.601 6.095
Finances (2.043) (2.212) (2.009) (2.169)
36,111 11,879 36,109 11,878
Satisfaction: 8.219 8.234 8.432 8.393
Partner (1.933) (1.933) (1.783) (1.770)
33,520 10,590 32,957 10,279
Satisfaction: 8.013 7.940 7.884 7.845
Overall (1.324) (1.361) (1.315) (1.377)
36,110 11,881 36,101 11,878
For each outcome we report the mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and number of observations.
Hours of work, housework and with children are per week. Number of hours worked is conditional on
being employed. Home ownership is measured at the household level. Fertility intentions report how
many more children are intended. All satisfaction outcomes are based on a 10-point Likert scale with 10
representing ‘totally satisfied’.
The main outcome variables are being employed, hours worked per week (condi-
tional on being employed), and hours spent on housework per week (excluding hours of
childcare). We also consider whether the couple are home owners, the number of own
dependent children in the household, hours per week spent with children for each partner,
and how many more children each partner intends to have. Finally, we look at self-reported
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measures of financial, partner and overall life satisfaction, reported on a ten-point Likert
scale with 10 reflecting being ‘totally satisfied’.20
Table 2 presents key summary statistics for our sample, broken down by sex and
by marital status. Compared to married women, cohabiting women work more hours
and spend fewer hours in housework. In contrast, cohabiting men are less likely to be
employed and work fewer hours than their married counterparts. Both married and
cohabiting men do substantially less housework than their female partners on average.
Compared to married couples, cohabiting couples are less likely to own a home, have
fewer children, spend less time with children, but intend to have more children in future.
Whilst cohabiting couples are less satisfied with their financial situation than married
couples, there is little difference in reported partner and overall satisfaction based on
marital status.
6 Results
We begin by presenting our main results for employment, hours worked, and hours spent
on housework. Table 3 presents coefficient estimates for three specifications for men and
women separately. Columns (1) and (4) show results with state, time and individual
fixed effects only; columns (2) and (5) additionally control for education; and columns
(3) and (6) add state time trends. We report coefficients on the indicators for being in
an equitable division regime, being a cohabiting couple, and our key result of being a
cohabiting couple in an equitable division regime.
The results show that the expansion of the equitable property division regime had
significant effects on household behavior. Affected men were 3 percentage points more
likely to be employed, and affected women spent two more hours per week on housework.
There is no evidence that men reduced their weekly hours of housework. Other effects
are not precisely estimated, but suggest that women changed their time-use by reducing
market work. The estimates are consistent across the three specifications. Together these
results suggest a specialization response among unmarried couples newly exposed to the
equitable property division regime. They are not consistent with a pure bargaining power
mechanism.
Table 3 also shows that women are more likely to be employed, work more hours per
week, and spend less time per week on housework when they are cohabiting than when
they are married. Cohabiting men are less likely to work and work fewer hours. These
20As these outcome variables are not all included and comparable in all waves of the survey, and
are drawn from different components including the in-person household-level questionnaire and the self-
completion questionnaire, there are different numbers of observations for the different outcomes. Ap-
pendix Table A1 sets out the questions used and their sources in detail.
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Table 3: Effect of equitable property division laws on employment, hours worked, and
housework
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employed
Equitable -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
[0.931] [0.922] [0.906] [0.273] [0.312] [0.810]
Cohabitation 0.104** 0.107** 0.107** -0.048** -0.046** -0.046**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
[0.023] [0.019] [0.020] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013]
Equitable*Cohab. -0.021 -0.023 -0.023 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
[0.237] [0.232] [0.232] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006]
Observations 48,003 48,003 48,003 48,003 48,003 48,003
Couples 8,170 8,170 8,170 8,170 8,170 8,170
Hours worked
Equitable 0.262 0.235 0.365 -0.489 -0.432 0.165
(0.342) (0.324) (0.386) (0.373) (0.368) (0.260)
[0.534] [0.569] [0.479] [0.299] [0.357] [0.571]
Cohabitation 4.320* 4.360* 4.371* -2.677** -2.540** -2.528**
(1.316) (1.271) (1.273) (0.470) (0.486) (0.482)
[0.064] [0.063] [0.063] [0.022] [0.023] [0.022]
Equitable*Cohab. -0.761 -0.712 -0.738 1.507 1.427 1.425
(1.235) (1.159) (1.164) (0.559) (0.576) (0.569)
[0.587] [0.587] [0.580] [0.207] [0.242] [0.240]
Observations 34,569 34,569 34,569 42,585 42,585 42,585
Couples 6,676 6,676 6,676 7,426 7,426 7,426
Housework hours
Equitable -0.099 -0.049 0.003 -0.114 -0.116 -0.338***
(0.291) (0.294) (0.296) (0.106) (0.103) (0.115)
[0.750] [0.871] [0.992] [0.344] [0.323] [0.003]
Cohabitation -5.251* -5.160** -5.153** -0.167 -0.176 -0.181
(0.803) (0.768) (0.766) (0.203) (0.196) (0.197)
[0.050] [0.048] [0.048] [0.514] [0.432] [0.404]
Equitable*Cohab. 2.029* 1.983* 1.974* 0.113 0.117 0.121
(0.938) (0.887) (0.884) (0.187) (0.180) (0.184)
[0.088] [0.090] [0.091] [0.604] [0.573] [0.555]
Observations 40,455 40,455 40,455 39,589 39,589 39,589
Couples 7,336 7,336 7,336 7,226 7,226 7,226
Controls
Education × X X × X X
State time trends × × X × × X
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses; wild bootstrapped
p-values in square brackets. All results include time, state and individual fixed effects. Education is a
set of six indicator variables.
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individual fixed effects estimates illustrate the average change in behavior within couples
when they change relationship status: when couples marry, they specialize. In general we
do not see significant changes in the behavior of married couples when equitable property
division is expanded to unmarried couples.
We also assess how the specialization effects vary across groups with different levels
of education. Appendix Table A2 breaks down the results in Table 3 by the woman’s
educational attainment. Most results are imprecisely estimated due to the smaller sample
sizes. However, it is clear that the increase in male employment is driven by couples with
low education, with a 6 percentage point increase in employment. There is suggestive
evidence that it is women with low and medium education who are more likely to increase
housework hours. That we see larger employment responses for less educated couples is
perhaps unsurprising: employment activity among men from more educated households
is already very high and may have less scope for further increase.
We now turn to evidence of effects on relationship-specific investments including
home ownership and children. Table 4 displays these results, with panel A giving results
for women and panel B for men. All results include state, time and individual fixed
effects and control for education and state time trends. Column (1) shows the impact
of equitable property division on home ownership: affected couples increase their home
ownership rate by 11 percentage points, indicating a substantial increase in couple-specific
investments.21 Columns (2) to (4) look at outcomes related to children. In column (2) we
see that the number of children a couple has increases by around 0.25, suggesting that a
quarter of affected cohabiting couples have a child. In column (3) we observe an increase
in the time spent with children of 4.1 hours per week for women and 2 hours per week for
men. In column (4), we look at the effects on fertility intentions. This is the number of
additional children men and women report intending to have (conditional on having said
they wish to have more children).22 Both men and women increase their intended number
of children by more than 0.1. Together these results suggest an increase in realized and
intended fertility and an increase in child investments, representing a substantive increase
in realized and planned couple-specific investments.
Columns (5) to (7) of Table 4 show results for three dimensions of self-reported
life satisfaction. For both men and women affected by the reform we find an increase in
reported satisfaction with finances, though this is not precisely estimated for men. Off-
setting this we find a significant reduction in partner satisfaction for men and women,
21This variable is captured at the household level so we are unable to distinguish whether a home
is jointly owned. For all couples subject to equitable property division laws the couple’s home will be
considered as part of the property subject to reallocation in the event of relationship breakdown.
22The sample size for this analysis is substantially smaller than for other outcomes because: (a)
individuals must report that they do intend to have more children to be asked this question; and (b)
the survey question is not comparable across all waves, meaning that responses in waves 5, 8 and 11 are
excluded.
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Table 4: Effect of equitable property division on other outcomes
Home Number Time w. Fertility Satisfaction with
owner† children children intention Finances Partner Overall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A: Women
Equitable -0.005 -0.044 -1.011 -0.071 0.110* 0.092** 0.029
(0.015) (0.017) (0.772) (0.072) (0.032) (0.028) (0.022)
[0.806] [0.155] [0.389] [0.492] [0.052] [0.0118] [0.244]
Cohabitation -0.225** -0.726*** -17.564** -0.045 -0.045 0.276** 0.050
(0.018) (0.029) (1.624) (0.030) (0.078) (0.037) (0.035)
[0.012] [0.001] [0.023] [0.229] [0.603] [0.014] [0.343]
Equitable*Cohab. 0.109** 0.255* 4.080* 0.109** 0.155* -0.170 -0.032
(0.015) (0.048) (1.422) (0.025) (0.059) (0.055) (0.039)
[0.024] [0.086] [0.053] [0.02] [0.084] [0.141] [0.647]
Observations 44,709 48,003 38,608 9,645 47,990 44,110 47,991
Couples 7,715 8,170 7,251 3,588 8,168 7,819 8,169
B: Men
Equitable -0.046** -0.408 -0.084** 0.129** 0.006 0.003
(0.013) (0.205) (0.033) (0.036) (0.042) (0.012)
[0.024] [0.169] [0.033] [0.041] [0.916] [0.849]
Cohabitation -0.783*** -6.707*** -0.068* -0.136 0.208*** 0.067
(0.025) (0.328) (0.015) (0.073) (0.022) (0.068)
[0.000] [0.003] [0.051] [0.380] [0.006] [0.667]
Equitable*Cohab. 0.283** 1.948** 0.143* 0.151 -0.175*** -0.043
(0.046) (0.311) (0.035) (0.094) (0.016) (0.057)
[0.047] [0.0268] [0.0689] [0.355] [0.004] [0.745]
Observations 48,003 38,041 9,605 47,987 43,236 47,979
Couples 8,170 7,152 3,536 8,169 7,698 8,169
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses; wild bootstrapped
p-values in square brackets. All results include time, state and individual fixed effects, education
controls (a set of six indicator variables) and state-specific time trends. †Home ownership is measured
at the household level so it gives a couple-level result. The smaller sample size for fertility intentions is
due to question routing and a lack of comparability across all waves as outlined in footnote 18.
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albeit imprecisely estimated for women. In column (7), these off-setting effects result in
no change in overall life satisfaction. Across all three domains the estimated effects are
symmetric for men and women. If a change in bargaining power was the predominant
mechanism through which exposure to equitable property division laws affected couple
behavior, we would expect to see an asymmetric response increasing one partner’s sat-
isfaction at the expense of the other’s. The symmetric effect we find instead suggests
that the reform changed couple behavior by enabling couple-specific investments, either
by solving an investment hold-up problem or by increasing the costs of separation.
6.1 Changing relationship status selection in response to the
reform
Our triple-difference fixed effects results identify the effect of the expansion of equitable
property division laws for couples observed cohabiting both pre- and post-reform. These
reforms may also have changed selection into and out of unmarried cohabitation. For
example, some couples may have separated or married in anticipation of the reform, or
chose not to get married when they otherwise would have done. This last mechanism is
of concern for our main results: one potential explanation for the finding that equitable
division makes unmarried couples behave more like married couples is that couples who
were planning to marry for the legal protections no longer need to.23
We look for evidence of changing selection in two ways. First, we directly look for
evidence of whether there was a change in the propensity to marry or separate for cohab-
iting couples both in anticipation of and after the reform. We implement a difference-in-
difference model for the sample of cohabiting couples only.24 The outcome variables are
separation and marriage. We first look at whether these transitions are more likely for
unmarried couples after they become subject to equitable property division laws. These
results are shown in Panel A of Table 5 for three specifications. We find no significant
change in the propensity to separate or to marry for affected unmarried couples after the
legal reforms. This suggests that our main results are not driven by couples who would
have married not doing so.
23Additionally, new couples forming may have chosen to marry rather than cohabit or vice versa,
changing the composition of married and cohabiting couples post-reform. We do not examine the changing
composition of new couples in this paper.
24We are not able to use married couples as a control group as they are not at risk of getting married.
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Table 5: Propensity of Cohabiting Couples to Change Relationship Status
Separate Marry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Post-equitable division expansion
Equitable 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.003 -0.031
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020)
[0.144] [0.152] [0.794] [0.667] [0.806] [0.260]
Observations 8,279 8,279 8,279 9,331 9,331 9,331
B: Year before equitable division expansion
Equitable -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 0.019* 0.022** 0.024**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
[0.475] [0.485] [0.575] [0.084] [0.032] [0.020]
Observations 8,279 8,279 8,279 9,331 9,331 9,331
Controls
Education × X X × X X
State time trends × × X × × X
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses; wild
bootstrapped p-values in square brackets. All results include time, state and individual fixed
effects. Education is a set of six indicator variables included separately for men and women.
We also look for evidence of marriage or separation in anticipation of the expansion
by including an additional interaction term for the year prior to expansion in affected
states. Panel B of Table 5 shows estimates of this additional interaction term. We find no
evidence of excess separation in the year immediately preceding the expansion of equitable
property division laws. We do, however, find that couples are more likely to have married
in the year prior to their expansion. To the extent that cohabiting couples with a strong
preference for couple-specific investments are those who marry in anticipation of these
reforms, our main results may underestimate their effects.
The second approach to examining how selection may affect our estimates is to
return to our main results and re-estimate, holding relationship status fixed at its pre-
reform status. This directly tests whether our results are robust to couples separating
in response to the reform and to couples choosing to marry after they become subject
to equitable property division. In Table 6, column (1) presents the main results, and
columns (2) and (3) present results fixing relationship status based on one and two years
before the expansions, respectively.
We find qualitatively similar results for all specifications. The larger magnitude of
point estimates across columns (2) and (3) provides suggestive evidence that increased
marriage rates in anticipation of the reform lead us to underestimate the intensity of the
specialization response.
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Table 6: Robustness checks: I
Main Fix status: Fix status:
results 1 year 2 year
(1) (2) (3)
A: Women
Employed -0.023 -0.027 -0.038*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.004)
[0.232] [0.274] [0.055]
Observations 48,003 42,148 37,076
Couples 8,170 6,794 5,995
Hours worked -0.738 -0.903 -1.813
(1.164) (0.913) (0.847)
[0.580] [0.586] [0.107]
Observations 34,569 30,498 26,933
Couples 6,676 5,566 4,898
Housework hours 1.974* 2.501* 2.392**
(0.884) (0.807) (0.529)
[0.091] [0.087] [0.014]
Observations 40,455 34,754 30,442
Couples 7,336 6,035 5,310
B: Men
Employed 0.029*** 0.047** 0.048*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
[0.006] [0.012] [0.050]
Observations 48,003 41,772 36,713
Couples 8,170 6,649 5,882
Hours worked 1.425 1.934 1.991**
(0.569) (0.554) (0.361)
[0.240] [0.157] [0.036]
Observations 42,585 36,419 31,909
Couples 7,426 5,981 5,268
Housework hours 0.121 -0.200 -0.051
(0.184) (0.233) (0.170)
[0.555] [0.617] [0.754]
Observations 39,589 34,099 29,799
Couples 7,226 5,848 5,161
** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses; wild bootstrapped
p-values in square brackets. All results include time, state and individual fixed effects, education as a
set of six indicator variables, and state time trends. The fix status (1 year) results exclude Tasmania
and Queensland due to pre-existing FLA-equivalent policies (see Table 1); the 2-year results also
exclude WA due to data availability.
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6.2 Additional robustness checks
Our main results assume that all cohabiting couples become subject to the equitable
division regime post-reform, and does not account for the gateway requirements of a
two-year relationship or a common child. We re-estimate our results only considering a
cohabiting couple subject to equitable division laws when they meet these requirements.
These results are presented in column (2) of Table 7. The results remain qualitatively
similar.
Second, we re-estimate our results excluding couples from Western Australia, which
has not referred jurisdiction over many family matters to the Commonwealth and operates
an independent but parallel family court system and therefore may not provide a suitable
control group. These results are shown in column (3) of Table 7, and it is evident that
with and without WA the results are similar.
Third, we exclude all couples who migrate between states at any point in our sample.
The concern is that migrating couples may choose their state of residence based on the
property division laws in force, and so move to an equitable property division state to
enable specialization; this could explain our results. Column (4) of Table 7 shows that the
employment responses for men and women who never migrated are consistent with the
main results. Excluding these couples, however, does significantly change the housework
result for men, suggesting that men in non-migrating unmarried couples significantly
increase their housework hours after the FLA expansion. This may suggest there are more
evenly shared joint investments in the household for non-migrating unmarried couples.
Finally, we re-estimate the main model accounting for the anticipation effects ob-
served in Table 5. We include an additional intercept shift for the year-before-reform
and its interaction with the indicator for cohabitation. The results in column (5) of Ta-
ble 7 therefore compare post-reform behavior to pre-reform behavior excluding the year
immediately before the reform. Similar to our results in Table 6, failing to account for the
higher propensity to marry in the year before the reform causes our main estimates to
underestimate the true specialization response.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented empirical evidence showing that the expansion of equitable prop-
erty division laws to unmarried couples leads to increased specialization and relationship-
specific investments for already-formed couples. We evaluate changes in laws across Aus-
tralia, including the 2009 expansion of the Family Law Act to unmarried couples. Our
empirical strategy exploits the disparate treatment of unmarried couples across states and
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Table 7: Robustness checks: II
Main Gateway Exclude Migration to Anticipation
results definition WA other States Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: Women
Employed -0.023 -0.020 -0.027 -0.018 -0.029
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
[0.232] [0.231] [0.203] [0.251] [0.218]
Observations 48,003 43,977 43,649 46,840 48,003
Couples 8,170 7,150 7,458 8,061 8,170
Hours worked -0.738 -0.784 -0.683 -0.723 -0.981
(1.164) (1.788) (1.185) (1.149) (1.298)
[0.580] [0.616] [0.586] [0.581] [0.573]
Observations 34,569 31,314 31,563 33,802 34,569
Couples 6,676 5,818 6,087 6,574 6,676
Housework hours 1.974* 1.852* 1.950 1.668 2.357*
(0.884) (1.038) (0.922) (0.953) (1.034)
[0.091] [0.072] [0.111] [0.125] [0.080]
Observations 40,455 37,104 36,715 39,430 40,455
Couples 7,336 6,431 6,696 7,227 7,336
B: Men
Employed 0.029*** 0.032* 0.029** 0.026** 0.033**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
[0.006] [0.079] [0.019] [0.015] [0.029]
Observations 48,003 43,977 43,649 46,840 48,003
Couples 8,170 7,150 7,458 8,061 8,170
Hours worked 1.425 1.167 1.703 1.366 1.573
(0.569) (0.567) (0.499) (0.578) (0.647)
[0.240] [0.328] [0.130] [0.240] [0.268]
Observations 42,585 39,030 38,623 41,598 42,585
Couples 7,426 6,513 6,760 7,320 7,426
Housework hours 0.121 0.099 0.088 0.328** 0.041
(0.184) (0.248) (0.173) (0.166) (0.217)
[0.555] [0.692] [0.653] [0.017] [0.855]
Observations 39,589 36,329 35,918 38,584 39,589
Couples 7,226 6,345 6,597 7,117 7,226
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses; wild bootstrapped
p-values in square brackets. All results include time, state and individual fixed effects, education as a
set of six indicator variables and state time trends.
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territories in a triple-difference fixed effects empirical strategy. We use a rich household
panel survey, allowing us to examine both hours of market work and housework. This
means, for example, that we are not restricted to interpreting a reduction in women’s labor
supply as an increase in leisure, but instead can see offsetting increases in housework.
We find that in affected couples, men increase their employment and women increase
their housework. Couples are more likely to become home owners, have more children,
and spend more time with their children. This is not explained by unmarried couples
choosing not to marry. Moreover, we find effects on reported life satisfaction across a
number of domains that are similar for men and women. These results strongly indi-
cate the importance of equitable property division laws in enabling relationship-specific
investments. This implies that financial arrangements on relationship breakdown can
improve well-being and not just reallocate welfare within households through changes in
bargaining power.
As unmarried cohabitation becomes more common throughout the developed world,
a range of different legal approaches have been taken to accommodate the hardships of
relationship breakdown. Our results demonstrate that legal approaches aimed at sharing
this burden when relationships end also have important incentive effects for intact couples.
Importantly, the extension of equitable property division rights to unmarried couples has
the (likely) unintended effect of making unmarried couples behave more like married
couples.
When considering the implications of our results in other international contexts,
it is important to note that even the restrictive approach taken by New South Wales
and Victoria before the FLA expansion provided more scope for property reallocation for
separating unmarried couples than currently exists in most US states and to England and
Wales. So, our analysis is of a comparatively small change in property division rights in
comparison to what could be expected if equitable division laws were introduced in these
other jurisdictions. Our results should therefore be seen as a lower bound to what to
expect elsewhere.
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A Appendix
Table A1: Variable descriptions and sources
Variable HILDA code Description Survey
Employment hours JBHRUC Hours per week usually worked in all jobs Individual
Housework hours LSHW Combined hrs/mins per week – housework Self-complete
Employed ESBRD Current labor force status Individual
Home ownership HSTENR Own, rent or live rent free Household
Number of children TCR Count of own resident children Individual
(excl. foster/step/grandchildren)
Time spent with children LSCHD Combined hrs/mins per week Self-complete
– playing with your children
Fertility intentions ICN How many more children intended Individual
Life satisfaction LOSAT Satisfaction – with your life Individual
Satisfaction with finances LOSATFS Satisfaction – with your financial situation Individual
Satisfaction with partner LSRELSP Satisfaction – with your partner Self-complete
Table A2: Effect of equitable division laws on employment, hours worked, and housework
by education group
Women Men
Education Low Medium High Low Medium High
Employed 0.020 -0.041 -0.075 0.060** 0.017 -0.008
(0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.022)
[0.449] [0.155] [0.134] [0.020] [0.443] [0.764]
Observations 23,167 11,000 13,836 23,167 11,000 13,836
Couples 4,006 2,005 2,159 4,006 2,005 2,159
Hours worked -1.053 -0.545 -0.489 1.791 1.597 0.705
(1.307) (1.399) (1.066) (0.789) (0.660) (1.238)
[0.566] [0.754] [0.926] [0.352] [0.115] [0.728]
Observations 14,882 8,170 11,517 19,739 9,852 12,994
Couples 2,935 1,726 2,015 3,499 1,845 2,082
Housework hours 1.990 2.846 0.992 0.335 -0.149 -0.088
(1.427) (1.184) (0.278) (0.323) (0.183) (0.232)
[0.296] [0.104] [0.125] [0.375] [0.475] [0.745]
Observations 18,926 9,362 12,167 18,480 9,179 11,930
Couples 3,480 1,831 2,025 3,440 1,803 1,983
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Wild bootstrapped
p-values are in square brackets; further details of their computation is in the appendix. All results
include time, state and individual fixed effects and state-specific time trends. Educational groups are
determined by the woman’s educational attainment. Low indicates high school completion or lower;
medium indicates a trade qualification (certificate or diploma), and high indicates a bachelor degree or
higher.
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